The cryptosystem recently proposed by Cramer and Shoup 5] is a practical public key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack provided the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption is true. Although this is a reasonable intractability assumption, it would be preferable to base a security proof on a weaker assumption, such as the Computational Di e-Hellman assumption. Indeed, this cryptosystem in its most basic form is in fact insecure if the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption is false. In this paper we present a practical hybrid scheme that is just as e cient as the scheme of of Cramer and Shoup; we prove that the scheme is secure if the Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption is true; we give strong evidence that the scheme is secure if the weaker, Computational Di e-Hellman assumption is true by providing a proof of security in the random oracle model.
Introduction
It is largely agreed upon in the cryptographic research community that the \right" de nition of security for a public key cryptosystem is security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, as de ned by Racko and Simon 13] and Dolev, Dwork, and Naor 7] . At least, this is the de nition of security that allows the cryptosystem to be deployed safely in the widest range of applications. This is IBM Research Report RZ 3139. Dolev , Dwork, and Naor 7] presented a cryptosystem that could be proven secure in this sense using a reasonable intractability assumption. However, their scheme was quite impractical. Subsequently, Bellare and Rogaway 1, 2] presented schemes that were quite practical, but lacked a proof of security in the standard model of computation. However, the schemes can be proven secure in the random oracle model, wherein a cryptographic hash function is modeled as a random oracle. In this model, Bellare and Rogaway proved the security of their schemes based on the standard RSA assumption.
A proof of security in the random oracle model provides strong evidence that breaking the scheme without breaking the underlying intractability assumptions will be quite di cult to do, although it does not rule out this possibility altogether. The advantage of a proof of security in the standard model is that it does not just provide such strong evidence, it proves that the scheme cannot be broken without breaking the underlying intractability assumptions.
Recently, Cramer and Shoup 5] presented a practical cryptosystem and proved its security in the standard model, based on the Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) assumption. It is hard to compare the security of this scheme with that of the schemes Bellare and Rogaway|although the former scheme can be analyzed in the standard model, and the latter schemes only in the random oracle model, the underlying intractability assumptions are incomparable. Indeed, a proof of security is worthless if the underlying assumptions turn out to be false, and in fact, both the Cramer-Shoup scheme (in its basic form) and the Bellare-Rogaway schemes are insecure if their respective assumptions are false.
Perhaps the strongest criticism against the Cramer-Shoup scheme is that the assumption is too strong; in particular, it has not been studied as extensively as other assumptions, including the RSA assumption.
In this paper, we address this criticism by presenting a hybrid variation of the Cramer-Shoup scheme. This scheme is just as e cient as the original, and a proof of security in the standard model can also be made based on the DDH assumption. However, the same scheme can also be proved secure in the random oracle model based on the Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) assumption. This assumption was introduced by Di e and Hellman 6] in their work that opened the eld of public key cryptography, and has been studied at least as intensively as any other intractability assumption used in modern cryptography. Thus, in comparison to other available practical encryption schemes, the scheme discussed here is arguably no less secure, while still admitting a proof of security in the standard model under a reasonable, if somewhat strong, intractability assumption.
We believe this \hedging with hash" approach may be an attractive design paradigm. The general form of this approach would be to design practical cryptographic schemes whose security can be proved in the standard model based on a reasonable, if somewhat strong, intractability assumption, but whose security can also be proved in the random oracle model under a weaker intractability assumption. This same \hedging with hash" security approach has also been applied to digital signature schemes: Cramer and Shoup 4] presented and analyzed a practical signature scheme that is secure in the standard model under the so-called Strong RSA assumption, but is also secure in the random oracle model under the ordinary RSA assumption. Although that paper and this paper both advocate this \hedging with hash" security approach, the technical details and proof techniques are quite unrelated. In the context of encryption or signatures, one can also \hedge" just by combining two schemes based on di erent intractability assumptions (via composition for encryption and via concatenation for signatures). However, this type of hedging is much more expensive computationally, and much less elegant than the type of hedging we are advocating here.
Security against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
We recall the de nition of security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. We begin by describing the attack scenario. First, the key generation algorithm is run, generating the public key and private key for the cryptosystem. The adversary, of course, obtains the public key, but not the private key.
Second, the adversary makes a series of arbitrary queries to a decryption oracle. Each query is a ciphertext that is decrypted by the decryption oracle, making use of the private key of the cryptosystem. The resulting decryption is given to the adversary. The adversary is free to construct the ciphertexts in an arbitrary way.
Third, the adversary prepares two messages m 0 ; m 1 , and gives these two an encryption oracle. The encryption oracle chooses b 2 f0; 1g at random, encrypts m b , and gives the resulting \target" ciphertext 0 to the adversary. The adversary is free to choose m 0 and m 1 in an arbitrary way, except that if message lengths are not xed by the cryptosystem, then these two messages must nevertheless be of the same length.
Fourth, the adversary continues to submit ciphertexts to the decryption oracle, subject only to the restriction that 6 = 0 . Just before the adversary terminates, it outputs b 0 2 f0; 1g, representing its \guess" of b.
That completes the description of the attack scenario. The adversary's advantage in this attack scenario is de ned to be the distance from 1=2 of the probability that b 0 = b.
A cryptosystem is de ned to be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if for any e cient adversary, its advantage is negligible.
Of course, this is a complexity-theoretic de nition, and the above description suppresses many details, e.g., there is an implicit security parameter which tends to in nity, and the terms \e cient" and \negligible" are technical terms, de ned in the usual way. One can work in a uniform (i.e., Turing machines) or a non-uniform model (i.e., circuits) of computation. This distinction will not a ect any results in this paper.
Intractability Assumptions
In this section, we discuss the intractability assumptions used in this paper.
Let G be a group of large prime order q.
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is this: given g 2 G with g 6 = 1
and g x , compute x (modulo q).
The Computational Di e-Hellman (CDH) problem is this: given g 2 G with g 6 = 1, along with g x and g y , compute g xy . A \good" algorithm for this problem is an e cient, probabilistic algorithm such that for all inputs, its output is correct with all but negligible probability. The CDH assumption is the assumption that no such \good" algorithm exists. Using well-known random-self reductions, along with the results of 11] or 14], the existence of such a \good" algorithm is equivalent to the existence of a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a correct answer with non-negligible probability, where the probability is taken over the coin ips of the algorithm, as well as a random choice of g 2 G, and x; y 2 Z q .
The Decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) problem is this: given g 2 G with g 6 = 1, along with g x , g y , and g z decide if z xy mod q. A \good" algorithm is an e cient, probabilistic algorithm such that for all inputs, its output is correct with all but negligible probability. The DDH is the assumption that no such \good" algorithm exists. Using the random-self reduction presented by Stadler 16] , the existence of such a \good" algorithm is equivalent to the existence of a probabilistic statistical test distinguishing the distributions (g; g x ; g y ; g z ) and (g; g x ; g y ; g xy ), where g 2 G, and x; y; z 2 Z q are randomly chosen.
All of these problems are equally hard in a \generic" model of computation, where an algorithm is not allowed to exploit the representation of the group G 14]; in this model, O( p q) group operations are both necessary and su cient. However, for speci c groups, special methods, such as \index calculus" methods, may apply, allowing for more e cient algorithms.
In general, the only known way to solve either the CDH or DDH problems is to rst solve the DL problem. However, there remains the possibility that the DL problem is hard and the CDH problem is easy, or that the CDH problem is hard, and the DDH problem is easy. Maurer 10] has shown that under certain circumstances, an algorithm for solving the CDH problem can be used to solve the DL problem. This reduction is a \generic" reduction that does not depend on the representation of the group G. It can also be shown that there is no such generic reduction allowing one to e ciently solve the CDH or DL problems using an algorithm for the DDH problem. This fact could be considered as evidence supporting the claim that the DDH assumption is possibly stronger than the CDH assumption.
As in the previous section, we have suppressed many details in the above discussion, e.g., there is an implicit security parameter that tends to in nity, and for each value of the security parameter, there is an implicit probability distribution of groups. 4 The Encryption Scheme
The basic Cramer-Shoup scheme
We recall the basic Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. The cryptosystem works with a group G of large prime order q. Key Generation. The key generation algorithm runs as follows. Random elements g 1 ; g 2 2 G are chosen, and random elements x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; z 2 Z q are also chosen. Next, the group elements c = g x 1 1 g x 2 2 ; d = g y 1 1 g y 2 2 ; h = g z 1 are computed. Finally, a key k indexing a universal one-way hash function UOWH is chosen. We assume that the output of the hash function is an element of Z q . The public key is (g 1 ; g 2 ; c; d; h; k), and the private key is (x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; z). Encryption. To encrypt, we assume a message m can be encoded as an element of G. The encryption algorithm runs as follows. First, it chooses r 2 Z q at random. Then it computes u 1 = g r 1 ; u 2 = g r 2 ; e = h r m; = UOWH(k; u 1 ; u 2 ; e); v = c r d r :
The ciphertext is = v:
If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs \reject"; otherwise, it outputs m = e=u z 1 :
In 5], it was shown that this scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, under the DDH assumption for G, and assuming UOWH is a secure universal one-way hash function. Although there are theoretical constructions for UOWH 12], a reasonable construction would be to use the compression function of SHA-1, in conjunction with the constructions in 3] or 15]. With this approach, the security of UOWH can be based on the assumption that the SHA-1 compression function is second-preimage collision resistant, a potentially much weaker assumption than full collision resistance.
A general hybrid construction
We describe here a general method for constructing a hybrid encryption scheme. To this end, it is convenient to de ne the notion of a key encapsulation scheme. This is a scheme that allows a party to generate a random bit string and send it to another party, encrypted under the receiving party's public key.
A key encapsulation scheme works just like a public key encryption scheme, except that the encryption algorithm takes no input other than the recipient's public key. Instead, the encryption algorithm generates a pair (K; ), where K is a random bit string of some speci ed length, say l, and is an encryption of K, that is, the decryption algorithm applied to yields K.
One can always use a public key encryption scheme for this purpose, generating a random bit string, and then encrypting it under the recipient's public key. However, as we shall see, one can construct a key encapsulation scheme in other ways as well.
One can easily adapt the notion of security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack to a key encapsulation scheme. The only di erence in the attack scenario is the behavior of the encryption oracle. The adversary does not give two messages to the encryption oracle. Rather, the encryption oracle runs the key encapsulation algorithm to obtain a pair (K 0 ; 0 ). The encryption oracle then gives the adversary either (K 0 ; 0 ) or (K 00 ; 0 ), where K 00 is an independent random l-bit string; the choice of K 0 versus K 00 depends on the value of the random bit b chosen by the encryption oracle.
Using a key encapsulation scheme that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, we can construct a hybrid public key cryptosystem that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack as follows.
We need a pseudo-random bit generator PRBG. There are theoretical constructions for such a generator, but a perfectly reasonable approach is to construct the generator using a standard block cipher, such as DES, basing its security on a reasonable pseudo-randomness assumption on the underlying block cipher. We assume that PRBG stretches l-bit strings to strings of arbitrary length. We assume here that 1=2 l is a negligible quantity.
We need a hash function AXUH suitable for message authentication, i.e., an almost XOR-universal hash function 8]. We assume that AXUH is keyed by an l-bit string and hashes arbitrary bit strings to l-bit strings. Many e cient constructions for AXUH exist that do not require any intractability assumptions.
To encrypt a message m, we run the key encapsulation scheme to obtain a random string K along with its encryption . Next, we apply PRBG to K to obtain l-bit strings K 1 , K 2 , and an jmj-bit string f. Finally, we compute e = f m; a = AXUH(K 1 ; e) K 2 :
The ciphertext is ( ; e; a): To decrypt ( ; e; a), we rst decrypt to obtain K. Note that decrypting may result in a \reject," in which case we \reject" as well. Otherwise, we apply PRBG to K to obtain l-bit strings K 1 , K 2 , and an jej-bit string f.
We then test if a = AXUH(K 1 ; e) K 2 . If this condition does not hold, we \reject." Otherwise, we output m = e f. Lemma 1 If the underlying key encapsulation scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, and PRBG is a secure pseudo-random bit generator, then the above hybrid scheme is also secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. This lemma appears to be a \folk theorem," and we leave it to the reader to verify its correctness.
A hybrid Cramer-Shoup scheme
We now describe a key encapsulation scheme based on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. Combined with the general hybrid construction in x4.2, this yields a hybrid encryption scheme. As a hybrid scheme, it is much more exible than the \basic" version of the scheme described in x4.1, as messages may be arbitrary bit strings and do not need to be encoded as group elements. This exibility allows one greater freedom in choosing the group G, which can be exploited to obtain a much more e cient implementation as well.
We need a pair-wise independent hash function PIH. We assume that PIH takes a key and maps elements 2 G to l-bit strings. Many e cient constructions for PIH exist that do not require any intractability assumptions. We will want to apply the Entropy Smoothing Theorem (see 9, Ch. 8]) to PIH, assuming that the input is a random group element. To do this effectively, the relative sizes of q and l must be chosen appropriately, so that q 2 l =q is a negligible quantity. We also need a \magic" hash function MH mapping elements of G to l-bit strings. This function is not required to satisfy any particular security requirements. A construction using a cryptographic hash like MD5 or SHA-1 is recommended (see 1]). This function will only play a role when we analyze the scheme in the random oracle model, where MH will be modeled as a random oracle. Now we are ready to describe the key encapsulation scheme.
Key Generation. Key generation is as in x4.1, except that a key for PIH is chosen at random; the public key is (g 1 ; g 2 ; c; d; h; k; ). We only brie y sketch the proof, as it di ers only slightly from the proof of the main theorem in 5].
Let 0 = (u 0 1 ; u 0 2 ; v 0 ) be the \target" ciphertext. For notational convenience and clarity, the internal variables used by the encryption algorithm in generating the target ciphertext will also be referred to in \primed" form, e.g., the value of for the target ciphertext is denoted 0 .
Using the arguments in 5], one can show that if an adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the original attack game, then he also has a non-negligible advantage in the following modi ed game.
This modi ed game is the same as the original game, except as follows.
In the modi ed game, the encryption oracle chooses u 0 1 ; u 0 2 ; 0 as random, independent group elements, and sets v 0 = (u 0 1 ) x 1 +y 1 0 (u 0 2 ) x 2 +y 2 0 . We refer the reader to 5] for details of this argument, which makes use of the DDH assumption, and also the security assumption on UOWH. Since PIH is a pair-wise independent hash function, so is the function 7 ! PIH( ; ) MH( ). By the Entropy Smoothing Theorem, from the adversary's view, the value K 0 = PIH( ; 0 ) MH( ) is statistically indistinguishable from a random l-bit string. Thus, the adversary could not have a non-negligible advantage in this modi ed game. That completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 2 Modeling MH as a random oracle, the above key encapsulation scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, under the CDH assumption for G, and also assuming that UOWH is a secure universal oneway hash function.
We now prove the theorem. Suppose there is an adversary that has a non-negligible advantage in the attack game. Now, Theorem 1 remains valid, even if we replace MH by a random oracle. So assuming the security properties of UOWH, the existence of an e cient adversary with non-negligible advantage implies the existence of an e cient algorithm for solving the DDH problem in G. In fact, the proof of Theorem 1 shows how to construct such an algorithm using the adversary as a subroutine; though technically \ecient," this may not be the most practical algorithm for solving the DDH problem in G; a more practical algorithm would certainly make the simulator we describe below more e cient.
In any case, we assume we have an e cient algorithm solving the DDH problem. To be precise, de ne the function DHP(g; g x ; g y ; g z ) to be 1 if g 6 = 1 and z xy mod q, and 0 otherwise. Then our assumption is that there is an e cient probabilistic algorithm that on all inputs computes DHP correctly, with negligible error probability. Now we show how to use this algorithm for DHP, together with an adversary that has non-negligible advantage in the attack game, to construct an e cient algorithm for solving the CDH problem. We assume that the instance of the CDH problem consists of randomly chosen group elements g 1 ; u 0 1 ; h 2 G, and our goal is to compute 0 such that DHP(g 1 ; u 0 1 ; h; 0 ) = 1.
We describe a simulator that simulates the adversary's view in the attack game. The input to the simulator is g 1 ; u 0 1 ; h 2 G as above.
The simulator constructs a public key for the cryptosystem as follows. It chooses w 2 Z q at random and sets g 2 = g w 1 . It computes x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 2 Z q , c; d 2 G, and the keys k; for UOWH and PIH just as in the normal key generation algorithm. The public key is (g 1 ; g 2 ; c; d; h; k; ).
The simulator is in complete control of the random oracle representing MH. We maintain a list L (initially empty) of input/output pairs ( ; MH( )). We also maintain a list L 0 (initially empty) of pairs ( ; K), where the K values are l-bit strings. Whenever the adversary evaluates the random oracle at a point , we add a pair ( ; MH( )) to L if does not already appear in L, and return the corresponding value MH( ). If does not appear in L, the value MH( ) is computed in one of two ways: if ( ; K) appears in the list L 0 for some value K, then we set MH( ) = K PIH( ; ); otherwise, we generate MH( ) as a random l-bit string. Pairs are added to the list L 0 in the simulation of the decryption oracle, as described below. Also, whenever a query is made to the random oracle, if DHP(g 1 ; u 0 1 ; h; ) = 1, we stop the simulator and output 0 = , thus solving the given instance of the CDH problem. Now we describe how the simulator deals with the encryption oracle. It computes u 0 2 = (u 0 1 ) w , and computes v 0 = (u 0 1 ) x 1 + 0 y 1 (u 0 2 ) x 2 + 0 y 2 . It outputs a random l-bit string K 0 and the \target" ciphertext 0 = (u 0 1 ; u 0 2 ; v 0 ). Note that the output of the encryption oracle is independent of the random bit b. Now we describe how the simulator deals with the decryption oracle. Let = (u 1 ; u 2 ; v) 6 = 0 be the input to the decryption oracle.
There are two sub-cases. In the rst sub-case, u 1 = u 0 1 . If the normal decryption would reject the ciphertext, the simulator rejects it as well. Otherwise, if the normal decryption algorithm does not reject the ciphertext, we \abort" the simulation. Using an argument along the lines in 5], which makes use of the assumption that UOWH is secure, it is straightforward to show that the probability that we have to \abort" the simulation is negligible.
In the second sub-case, u 1 6 = u 0 1 . If the normal decryption algorithm would reject the ciphertext, the simulator rejects it as well. Otherwise, the simulator searches through the values in the list L, searching for such that DHP(g 1 ; u 1 ; h; ) = 1. Suppose such a is found. Then the simulator simply computes K in the usual way. Otherwise, if no such is found, the simulator simply chooses an l-bit string K at random, and adds the pair (u 1 ; K) to the list L 0 .
That completes the description of the simulator. Assuming that UOWH is secure, one can verify that joint distribution of the adversary's view and the bit b in this simulation is statistically indistinguishable from that in the actual attack game, at least up to the point where the adversary queries the random oracle at the point = 0 . But up to that point, the bit b is independent of the adversary's view, and since we are assuming the adversary does have a non-negligible advantage, the adversary must query the random oracle at the point = 0 with non-negligible probability.
That completes the proof of Theorem 2.
